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Abstract
Although the definition and measurement of intelligence is clearly of
fundamental importance to the field of artificial intelligence, no general
survey of definitions and tests of machine intelligence exists. Indeed few
researchers are even aware of alternatives to the Turing test and its many
derivatives. In this paper we fill this gap by providing a short survey of the
many tests of machine intelligence that have been proposed.
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1 Introduction
Despite solid progress on many fronts over the last 50 years, artificial intelligence is
still a very young field with many of its greatest achievements, and some of its most
fundamental problems, yet to be tackled. From a theoretical perspective, one of
the most fundamental problems in the field is that the very concept of intelligence
remains rather murky. This is somewhat true in the context of humans, but it
is especially true when we consider machines which may have completely different
sensors, bodies, cognitive capacities and live in different environments to ourselves.
What does “intelligence” mean for a machine? Perhaps the first attempt to answer
this question, and certainly the only attempt that most researchers are aware of,
is Alan Turing’s famous imitation game [33]. Turing recognised how difficult it
would be to explicitly define intelligence and thus attempted to sidestep the issue
completely. Although this was a clever move, it leaves us with a test of machine
intelligence that tells us almost nothing about what intelligence actually is, and thus
is of little use as a foundation, either theoretical or practical, for our research.
Since then, a few bold researchers have tried to tackle this difficult problem
in a more satisfactory way by proposing various definitions and tests of machine
intelligence. By and large, these proposals have been ignored by the community.
Indeed to the best of our knowledge, no general survey of tests and definitions of
intelligence for machines has ever been published.
We feel that to ignore a question as fundamental as the definition of machine
intelligence is a serious mistake. In any science, issues surrounding fundamental
definitions and methods of measurement play a central role and form the foundation
on which theoretical advances are constructed and practical advances are measured.
If we are to truly advance as a field over the next 50 years, we will need to return
to this most central of problems in order to secure what artificial intelligence is and
what it aims for. As a first step in this direction, it is necessary that researchers are
at least aware of the many alternatives to Turing’s tests that have been proposed.
In this paper we hope to partly meet this need by providing the first general survey
of tests and definitions of machine intelligence.
2 Turing test and derivatives
The classic approach to determining whether a machine is intelligent is the so called
Turing test [33] which has been extensively debated over the last 50 years [26].
Turing realised how difficult it would be to directly definite intelligence and thus
attempted to side step the issue by setting up his now famous imitation game: If
human judges cannot effectively discriminate between a computer and a human
through teletyped conversation, then we must conclude that the computer is intel-
ligent.
Though simple and clever, the test has attracted much criticism. Block and
Searle argue that passing the test is not sufficient to establish intelligence [3, 28, 7].
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Essentially they both argue that a machine could appear to be intelligent without
having any “real intelligence”, perhaps by using a very large table of answers to
questions. While such a machine might be impossible in practice due to the vast
size of the table required, it is not logically impossible. In which case an unintelligent
machine could, at least in theory, consistently pass the Turing test. Some consider
this to bring the validity of the test into question. In response to these challenges,
even more demanding versions of the Turing test have been proposed such as the
Total Turing test [11], the Truly Total Turing test [27] and the inverted Turing test
[35]. Dowe argues that the Turing test should be extended by ensuring that the
agent has a compressed representation of the domain area, thus ruling out look-up
table counter arguments [6]. Of course these attacks on the Turing test can be
applied to any test of intelligence that considers only a system’s external behaviour,
that is, most intelligence tests.
A more common criticism is that passing the Turing test is not necessary to
establish intelligence. Usually this argument is based on the fact that the test
requires a machine to have a highly detailed model of human knowledge and patterns
of thought, making it a test of humanness rather than intelligence [9, 8]. Indeed even
small things like pretending to be unable to perform complex arithmetic quickly and
faking human typing errors become important, something which clearly goes against
the purpose of the test.
The Turing test has other problems as well. Current AI systems are a long way
from being able to pass an unrestricted Turing test. From a practical point of view
this means that the full Turing test is unable to offer much guidance to our work.
Indeed, even though the Turing test is the most famous test of machine intelligence,
almost no current research in artificial intelligence is specifically directed toward
being able to pass it. Unfortunately, simply restricting the domain of conversation in
the Turing test to make the test easier, as is done in the Loebner competition [22], is
not sufficient. With restricted conversation possibilities the most successful Loebner
entrants are even more focused on faking human fallibility, rather than anything
resembling intelligence [15]. Perhaps a better alternative then is to test whether a
machine can imitate a child (see for example the tests described in Sections 4 and 5).
Finally, the Turing test returns different results depending on who the human judges
are. Its unreliability has in some cases lead to clearly unintelligent machines being
classified as human, and at least one instance of a human actually failing a Turing
test. When queried about the latter, one of the judges explained that “no human
being would have that amount of knowledge about Shakespeare”[29].
3 Compression tests
Mahoney has proposed a particularly simple solution to the binary pass or fail prob-
lem with the Turing test: Replace the Turing test with a text compression test [23].
In essence this is somewhat similar to a “Cloze test” where an individual’s com-
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prehension and knowledge in a domain is estimated by having them guess missing
words from a passage of text.
While simple text compression can be performed with symbol frequencies, the
resulting compression is relatively poor. By using more complex models that capture
higher level features such as aspects of grammar, the best compressors are able to
compress text to about 1.5 bits per character for English. However humans, which
can also make use of general world knowledge, the logical structure of the argument
etc., are able to reduce this down to about 1 bit per character. Thus the compression
statistic provides an easily computed measure of how complete a machine’s model
of language, reasoning and domain knowledge are, relative to a human.
To see the connection to the Turing test, consider a compression test based on a
very large corpus of dialogue. If a compressor could perform extremely well on such
a test, this is mathematically equivalent to being able to determine which sentences
are probable at a given point in a dialogue, and which are not (for the equivalence
of compression and prediction see [2]). Thus, as failing a Turing test occurs when a
machine (or person!) generates a sentence which would be improbable for a human,
extremely good performance on dialogue compression implies the ability to pass a
Turing test.
A recent development in this area is the Hutter Prize [17]. In this test the
corpus is a 100 MB extract from Wikipedia. The idea is that this should represent
a reasonable sample of world knowledge and thus any compressor that can perform
very well on this test must have a good model of not just English, but also world
knowledge in general.
One criticism of compression tests is that it is not clear whether a powerful
compressor would easily translate into a general purpose artificial intelligence.
4 Linguistic complexity
A more linguistic approach is taken by the HAL project at the company Artificial
Intelligence NV [32]. They propose to measure a system’s level of conversational
ability by using techniques developed to measure the linguistic ability of children.
These methods examine things such as vocabulary size, length of utterances, re-
sponse types, syntactic complexity and so on. This would allow systems to be
“. . . assigned an age or a maturity level beside their binary Turing test assessment
of ‘intelligent’ or ‘not intelligent’ ”[31]. As they consider communication to be the
basis of intelligence, and the Turing test to be a valid test of machine intelligence,
in their view the best way to develop intelligence is to retrace the way in which
human linguistic development occurs. Although they do not explicitly refer to their
linguistic measure as a test of intelligence, because it measures progress towards
what they consider to be a valid intelligence test, it acts as one.
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5 Multiple cognitive abilities
A broader developmental approach is being taken by IBM’s Joshua Blue project [1].
In this project they measure the performance of their system by considering a broad
range of linguistic, social, association and learning tests. Their goal is to first pass
what they call a “toddler Turing test”, that is, to develop an AI system that can
pass as a young child in a similar setup to the Turing test. As yet, this test is not
fully specified.
Another company pursuing a similar developmental approach based on measur-
ing system performance through a broad range of cognitive tests is the a2i2 project
at Adaptive AI [34]. Rather than toddler level intelligence, their current goal to is
work toward a level of cognitive performance similar to that of a small mammal.
The idea being that even a small mammal has many of the key cognitive abilities
required for human level intelligence working together in an integrated way. While
this might be useful to guide the development of moderate intelligence, it is unknown
whether it will scale to higher levels of intelligence. The specific tests being used
have not been published.
6 Competitive games
The Turing Ratio method of Masum et al. has more emphasis on tasks and games
rather than cognitive tests. They propose that “. . . doing well at a broad range
of tasks is an empirical definition of ‘intelligence’.”[24] To quantify this they seek
to identify tasks that measure important abilities, admit a series of strategies that
are qualitatively different, and are reproducible and relevant over an extended pe-
riod of time. They suggest a system of measuring performance through pairwise
comparisons between AI systems that is similar to that used to rate players in the
international chess rating system. The key difficulty however, which the authors
acknowledge is an open challenge, is to work out what these tasks should be, and to
quantify just how broad, important and relevant each is. In our view these are some
of the most central problems that must be solved when attempting to construct an
intelligence test and thus this approach is incomplete in its current state.
7 Collection of psychometric tests
An approach called Psychometric AI tries to address the problem of what to test
for in a pragmatic way. In the view of Bringsjord and Schimanski, “Some agent
is intelligent if and only if it excels at all established, validated tests of [human]
intelligence.”[4] They later broaden this to also include “tests of artistic and literary
creativity, mechanical ability, and so on.” With this as their goal, their research is
focused on building robots that can perform well on standard psychometric tests
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designed for humans, such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligent Scale and Raven Pro-
gressive Matrices.
As effective as these tests are for humans, they seem inadequate for measuring
machine intelligence as they are highly anthropocentric and embody basic assump-
tions about the test subject that are likely to be violated by computers. For example,
consider the fundamental assumption that the test subject is not simply a collection
of specialised algorithms designed only for answering common IQ test questions.
While this is obviously true of a human, or even an ape, it may not be true of a
computer. The computer could be nothing more than a collection of specific al-
gorithms designed to identify patterns in shapes, predict number sequences, write
poems on a given subject or solve verbal analogy problems — all things that AI
researchers have worked on. Such a machine might be able to obtain a respectable
IQ score [25], even though outside of these specific test problems it would be next
to useless. If we try to correct for these limitations by expanding beyond standard
tests, as Bringsjord and Schimanski seem to suggest, this once again opens up the
difficulty of exactly what, and what not, to test for. Psychometric AI, at least as it
is currently formulated, only partially addresses this central question.
8 Smith’s test
The basic structure of Smith’s test is that an agent faces a series of problems that
are generated by an algorithm [30]. In each iteration the agent must try to produce
the correct response to the problem that it has been given. The problem generator
then responds with a score of how good the agent’s answer was. If the agent so
desires it can submit another answer to the same problem. At some point the agent
requests to the problem generator to move onto the next problem and the score that
the agent received for its last answer to the current problem is then added to its
cumulative score. Each interaction cycle counts as one time step and the agent’s
intelligence is then its total cumulative score considered as a function of time. In
order to keep things feasible, the problems must all be in P, i.e. the solution must
be verifiable in polynomial time.
We have two main criticisms of Smith’s definition. Firstly, while for practical
reasons it might make sense to restrict problems to be in P, we do not see why this
practical restriction should be a part of the very definition of intelligence as Smith
suggests. If some breakthrough meant that agents could solve difficult problems in
not just P but sometimes in NP as well, then surely these new agents would be more
intelligent?
Secondly, while the definition is somewhat formally defined, it still leaves open
the important question of what exactly the tests should be. Smith suggests that
researchers should dream up tests and then contribute them to some common pool
of tests. As such, this is not a fully specified test.
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9 C-Test
One perspective among psychologists who support the g-factor view of intelligence,
is that intelligence is “the ability to deal with complexity”[10]. Thus in a test
of intelligence the most difficult questions are the ones that are the most complex
because these will, by definition, require the most intelligence to solve. It follows then
that if we could formally define and measure the complexity of test problems we could
construct a formal test of intelligence. The possibility of doing this was perhaps first
suggested by the complexity theorist Chaitin [5]. While this path requires numerous
difficulties to be dealt with, we believe that it is the most natural and offers many
advantages: It is formally motivated, precisely defined and potentially could be used
to measure the performance of both computers and biological systems on the same
scale without the problem of bias towards any particular species or culture.
One intelligence test that is based on formal complexity theory is the C-Test
from Herna´ndez [13, 14]. This test consists of a number of sequence prediction and
abduction problems similar to those that appear in many standard IQ tests. Similar
to standard IQ tests, the C-Test always ensures that each question has an unambigu-
ous answer in the sense that there is always one hypothesis that is consistent with
the observed pattern that has significantly lower complexity than the alternatives.
The key difference to sequence problems that appear in standard intelligence tests is
that the questions are based on a formally expressed measure of complexity, namely
Levin’s computable Kt complexity [20] (rather than Kolmogorov’s incomputable
complexity [21]) to get a practical test. In order to retain the invariance property of
Kolmogorov complexity, Levin complexity requires the additional assumption that
the universal Turing machines are able to simulate each other in linear time.
The test has been successfully applied to humans with intuitively reasonable
results [14, 12]. As far as we know, this is the only formal definition of intelligence
that has so far produced a usable test of intelligence.
One criticism of the C-Test and Smith’s tests is that the way intelligence is
measured is essentially static, that is, the environments are passive. We believe that
dynamic testing in active environments is a better measure of a system’s intelligence.
To put this argument another way: Succeeding in the real world requires you to be
more than an insightful spectator! One must carefully choose actions knowing that
these may affect the future.
10 Universal intelligence
Another complexity based test is the universal intelligence test [19]. Unlike the
C-Test and Smith’s test, universal intelligence tests the performance of an agent in
a fully interactive environment. This is done by using the reinforcement learning
framework in which the agent sends its actions to the environment and receives
observations and rewards back. The agent tries to maximise the amount of reward
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it receives by learning about the structure of the environment and the goals it needs
to accomplish in order to receive rewards.
Formally, the process of interaction produces an increasing history
o1r1a1o2r2a2o3r3a3o4 . . . of observations o, rewards r ≥ 0, and actions a. The agent
is simply a function, denoted by pi, which is a probability measure over actions con-
ditioned on the current history, for example, pi(a3|o1r1a1o2r2). The environment,
denoted µ, is similarly defined: µ(okrk|o1r1a1o2r2a2 . . . ok−1rk−1ak−1). The perfor-
mance of agent pi in environment µ can be measured by its total expected reward
V piµ := E[
∑
∞
i=1 ri|µ, pi], called value. The largest interesting class of environments is
the class E of all computable probability distributions µ. For technical reasons, the
values are assumed to be bounded by some constant c.
To get a single performance measure V piµ is averaged over all µ ∈ E. As there
are an infinite number of environments, with no bound on their complexity, it is
impossible to take the expected value with respect to a uniform distribution —
some environments must be weighted more heavily than others. Considering the
agent’s perspective on the problem, it is the same as asking: Given several different
hypotheses which are consistent with the observations, which hypothesis should be
considered the most likely? This is a fundamental problem in inductive inference for
which the standard solution is to invoke Occam’s razor: Given multiple hypotheses
which are consistent with the data, simpler ones should be preferred. As this is gen-
erally considered the most intelligent thing to do, one should test agents in such a
way that they are, at least on average, rewarded for correctly applying Occam’s ra-
zor. This means that the a priori distribution over environments should be weighted
towards simpler environments.
As each environment µ is described by a computable measure, their complexity
can be measured with Kolmogorov complexity K(µ), which is simply the length of
the shortest program that computes µ [21]. The right a priori weight for µ is 2−K(µ).
We can now define the universal intelligence of an agent pi to simply be its expected
performance,
Υ(pi) :=
∑
µ∈E
2−K(µ)V piµ .
By construction, universal intelligence measures the general ability of an agent to
perform well in a very wide range of environments, similar to the essence of many
informal definitions of intelligence [18]. The definition places no restrictions on
the internal workings of the agent; it only requires that the agent is capable of
generating output and receiving input which includes a reward signal. If we wish
to bias the test to reflect world knowledge then we can condition the complexity
measure. For example, use K(µ|D) where D is some set of background knowledge
such as Wikipedia.
By considering V piµ for a number of basic environments, such as small MDPs,
and agents with simple but very general optimisation strategies, it is clear that
Υ correctly orders the relative intelligence of these agents in a natural way. A
very high value of Υ would imply that an agent is able to perform well in many
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environments. The maximal agent with respect to Υ is the theoretical AIXI agent
which has been shown to have many strong optimality properties [16]. These results
confirm that agents with high universal intelligence are indeed very powerful and
adaptable. Universal intelligence spans simple adaptive agents right up to super
intelligent agents like AIXI. The test is completely formally specified in terms of
fundamental concepts such as universal Turing computation and complexity and
thus is not anthropocentric.
A test based on Υ would evaluate the performance of an agent on a large sample
of simulated environments, and then combine the agent’s performance in each envi-
ronment into an overall intelligence value. The key challenge that needs to be dealt
with is to find a suitable replacement for the incomputable Kolmogorov complexity
function, possibly Levin’s Kt complexity [20], as is done by the C-Test.
11 Summary
We end this survey with a comparison of the various tests considered. Table 1 rates
each test according to the properties described below. Although we have attempted
to be as fair as possible, some of the scores we give on this table will naturally be
debatable. Nevertheless, we hope that it provides a rough overview of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the proposals.
Valid : A test of intelligence should capture intelligence and not some related
quantity. Informative: The result should be a scalar value, or perhaps a vector.
Wide range: A test should cover low levels of intelligence up to super intelligence.
General : Ideally we would like to have a very general test that could be applied
to everything from a fly to a machine learning algorithm. Dynamic: A test should
directly take into account the ability to learn and adapt over time. Unbiased : A test
should not be biased towards any particular culture, species, etc. Fundamental : We
do not want a test that needs to be changed from time to time due to changing tech-
nology and knowledge. Formal : The test should be precisely defined, ideally using
mathematics. Objective: The test should not appeal to subjective assessments such
as the opinions of human judges. Fully Defined : Has the test been fully defined, or
are parts still unspecified? Universal : Is the test universal, or is it anthropocentric?
Practical : A test should be able to be performed quickly and automatically. Test vs.
Def : Finally we note whether the proposal is more of a test, more of a definition,
or something in between.
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Table 1: In the table  means “yes”, • means “debatable”, · means “no”, and ?
means unknown. When something is rated as unknown that is usually because the
test in question is not sufficiently specified.
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Turing Test • · · · • · · · · • · • T
Total Turing Test • · · · • · · · · • · · T
Inverted Turing Test • • · · • · · · · • · • T
Toddler Turing Test • · · · • · · · · · · • T
Linguistic Complexity •  • · · · · • • · • • T
Text Compression Test •   • · • •    •  T
Turing Ratio •    ? ? ? ? ? · ? ? T/D
Psychometric AI   •  ? • · • • • · • T/D
Smith’s Test •   • · ?    · ? • T/D
C-Test •   • ·        T/D
Universal Intelligence            · D
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